# Configure the Temporal Proxy > For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.temporal.io/llms.txt). > Any documentation page is available as raw Markdown by appending `.md` to its URL. > Configure Temporal Proxy routing, upstreams, TLS, authentication, and payload encryption. > **Pre-release** > Temporal Proxy is under active development and evolving quickly. Behavior and configuration can change between > releases. See the [temporal-proxy repository](https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy) for the current status and > the definitive configuration schema. The proxy reads a single YAML file. Three sections are the core of it: the gateway listener (`hostPort`), `routing`, and the `upstreams` it forwards to. Everything else is optional. - `allowedServices` narrows which gRPC services the proxy forwards - `tls` and `auth` secure and admit inbound connections - `encryption` seals payloads - `extensionServers` declares the servers `auth` and `encryption` delegate to - `health` tunes the liveness check - `metrics` configures the Prometheus endpoint - `apiTranslations` overrides how the proxy reaches Temporal Cloud's control plane Values support `${VAR}` and `$VAR` environment variable expansion, and an upstream's `hostPort` can be a template that resolves per request (for example, `{{ .RemoteNamespace }}`). The example below is the proxy's [Temporal Cloud example](https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/tree/main/examples/cloud), which connects a Worker to Temporal Cloud with an API key. The Worker carries no Cloud configuration: it talks plaintext to `127.0.0.1:7233`, and the proxy adds TLS, the API key, and the Namespace rewrite on the way out. ```yaml # Gateway: the local endpoint your Workers and Clients connect to (plaintext). hostPort: 127.0.0.1:7233 routing: default: cloud # Namespaced requests. system: system # Namespace-less requests (for example GetSystemInfo on connect). upstreams: # Namespaced traffic. The host is derived per request from the translated # Namespace, so one entry serves any number of Namespaces. - name: cloud hostPort: '{{ .RemoteNamespace }}.tmprl.cloud:7233' namespaces: rules: suffix: .$TEMPORAL_ACCOUNT # quickstart becomes quickstart. credentials: static: apiKey: $TEMPORAL_API_KEY # Namespace-less calls have no Namespace to derive a host from, so they use a # fixed endpoint. Any Namespace endpoint in the account answers them. - name: system hostPort: ${TEMPORAL_NAMESPACE}.${TEMPORAL_ACCOUNT}.tmprl.cloud:7233 credentials: static: apiKey: ${TEMPORAL_API_KEY} ``` Neither upstream declares a `tls` block, because the proxy dials over TLS by default. See [Configure TLS](#configure-tls). The [chart `values.yaml`](https://github.com/temporalio/helm-charts/tree/main/charts/temporal-proxy) and the [temporal-proxy repository](https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy) hold the complete, current set of options. ## Restrict forwarded services The top-level `allowedServices` list names the gRPC services the proxy forwards, by proto full name. Omit it and the proxy forwards `WorkflowService` and `OperatorService`, which is what an SDK Client, a Worker, the CLI, and the Web UI need. ```yaml allowedServices: - temporal.api.workflowservice.v1.WorkflowService - temporal.api.operatorservice.v1.OperatorService - grpc.reflection.v1.ServerReflection ``` | Service | Backs | In the default set | | ------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | | `temporal.api.workflowservice.v1.WorkflowService` | Every SDK Client, Worker, and the Web UI | Yes | | `temporal.api.operatorservice.v1.OperatorService` | `temporal operator` commands, and the Web UI's Search Attribute and Nexus views | Yes | | `grpc.reflection.v1.ServerReflection` | Service discovery for tools such as `grpcurl` | No | Those three are the whole set to select from. A name the proxy cannot forward fails the configuration at startup rather than at the first request. A service you leave out is never forwarded. The gateway answers a call to one with `Unimplemented` and `unknown service ""`, decided before any upstream work, so the proxy behaves as a server that does not implement it rather than passing the call through. Service discovery is opt-in, so name the reflection service only when you want tools such as `grpcurl` to probe the gateway. Allowing `grpc.reflection.v1.ServerReflection` also allows the superseded `grpc.reflection.v1alpha.ServerReflection`, because clients probe `v1` and fall back to it. The relation runs one way: allowing only the superseded spelling does not allow the current one. ## Health checks The gateway serves the standard gRPC health service and publishes an entry for every allowed service under its proto full name, alongside the usual empty service name. Each entry reports the same status, since the proxy's health is process-wide. A Client health check that names a service, such as the Go SDK's `CheckHealth`, therefore gets a status, and so does a per-service liveness probe. A service your configuration does not allow returns `NOT_FOUND` instead of claiming a status. Behind that status is a liveness check the proxy runs against itself. On each interval it calls `grpc.health.v1.Health/Watch` over an in-process connection, reads one message, and reports whether the exchange was answered at all. `Watch` is a streaming method, so the call travels the same interceptor chain every forwarded request goes through, and a stall in that chain shows up in the reported status instead of going unnoticed. The call never leaves the process, so the check behaves the same whether the gateway serves plaintext, TLS, or mutual TLS. What the check does not cover is anything below that chain: accepting on the real listener, and the TLS handshake above it. Those belong to whatever probes the proxy from outside. See [Probe the gateway](/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/deploy-kubernetes#probe-the-gateway) for the Kubernetes side. Tune the cadence under the top-level `health` block. Both fields are optional: ```yaml health: interval: 30s # How often the liveness check runs. Defaults to 30s. timeout: 5s # Bounds one run. Defaults to 5s. ``` `timeout` must be positive and strictly shorter than `interval`, so a check always finishes before the next one begins. A configuration that breaks that rule fails at startup. ## Route requests The `routing` section selects an upstream for each request: - `default` is the fallback when no rule matches. It is optional; omit it to reject unmatched requests with an error. - `system` is the upstream for Namespace-less requests, such as the SDK's `GetSystemInfo` and `GetClusterInfo` calls. It is optional; when unset, those requests fall back to `default`. - `rules` is an ordered list, evaluated top to bottom. The first match wins. Every upstream named by `default`, `system`, or a rule must exist in `upstreams`. Upstream `name` and `hostPort` values must each be unique across the list: two upstreams sharing a name make a routing reference ambiguous, and two sharing an address is a copy-paste error rather than a useful configuration. ```yaml routing: default: local # Fallback when no rule matches. system: cloud # Namespace-less requests. rules: - match: namespace: 'prod-*' metadata: x-tier: gold upstream: cloud - match: namespace: '*-test' upstream: local ``` A rule matches when its Namespace matches and every metadata condition matches (AND logic). A `match` must set at least one of `namespace` or `metadata`; an empty match is a configuration error, since that is what `default` is for. Routing runs on the local Namespace, before translation. `namespace` is a string literal or a simple glob with a single leading or trailing `*`: | Pattern | Matches | | ---------- | --------------------------- | | `payments` | exactly `payments` | | `prod-*` | names starting with `prod-` | | `*-test` | names ending with `-test` | | `*-test-*` | names containing `-test-` | | `*` | any Namespace | A `*` in any other position, such as `a*b`, is invalid. `metadata` matches gRPC request metadata (headers). Keys are case-insensitive and do not support wildcards; values use the same glob syntax as `namespace`. A key matches when any of the request's values for it match. ## Translate Namespaces Applications connected to the proxy use short, local Namespace names. Each upstream rewrites those names to the ones its Temporal Service expects, under `namespaces.rules`. The rewrite applies to requests and is reversed on responses, so callers only ever see the local name. ```yaml upstreams: - name: cloud hostPort: '{{ .RemoteNamespace }}.tmprl.cloud:7233' namespaces: rules: prefix: '' # Optional string prepended to the local name. suffix: .acct # payments becomes payments.acct overrides: # Explicit pairs that bypass prefix and suffix. - local: billing remote: payments.acct ``` - `prefix` and `suffix` wrap every local Namespace: the remote name is `prefix + local + suffix`, and responses are unwrapped back to the local name. - `overrides` lists explicit `local` and `remote` pairs for names that do not follow the prefix and suffix convention. An override takes precedence over the prefix and suffix rules. Each local name and each remote name may appear only once. An upstream's `hostPort` and `tls.serverName` can be Go templates resolved per request, so one upstream can serve many Namespaces. Available variables: - `{{ .LocalNamespace }}`: the Namespace before translation. - `{{ .RemoteNamespace }}`: the Namespace after translation. - `{{ .Metadata. }}` or `{{ index .Metadata "" }}`: a request metadata value. Upstreams with a static `hostPort` connect eagerly at startup; templated ones connect lazily on first use. ### Translate to a Temporal Cloud upstream Temporal Cloud takes a fully qualified `.`, so the proxy checks the names a Cloud upstream's rules produce: - `suffix` must be `.`. - Each override's `remote` must be a complete Cloud Namespace identifier. A Namespace name runs 2 to 39 characters, starts with a letter, ends with a letter or number, and holds only lowercase letters, numbers, and `-`. An account identifier runs 5 to 20 characters. Both are checked at startup, so rules that cannot produce a valid Cloud name fail before the proxy serves anything. The proxy recognizes Cloud from the address: any `.tmprl.cloud` host, templated ones included. A `tls.serverName` on the Cloud domain counts too, since a private-link upstream reaches Cloud through a per-VPC hostname but still pins Cloud's certificate. When neither names the Cloud domain, declare it: ```yaml upstreams: - name: cloud hostPort: my-vpc-endpoint.example.internal:7233 cloud: true # Declare Cloud for an address carrying no Cloud domain. namespaces: rules: suffix: .acct ``` A templated `hostPort` resolves per request, so the name it produces cannot be checked at startup. The proxy logs a warning when a translated name is not shaped like a Cloud Namespace and forwards the request unchanged. ## Answer the methods Cloud does not serve Temporal Cloud does not serve every `WorkflowService` method on a Namespace endpoint. `ListNamespaces` is one this affects, for example: Cloud pins a request to the endpoint's Namespace, and a `ListNamespaces` request names none, so the call can never succeed on a Namespace frontend. Cloud exposes the same capability as `CloudService.GetNamespaces` on its control plane. The proxy answers such a call from the control plane and converts the reply back into the response the caller expected. This needs no configuration. It follows from an upstream already being Temporal Cloud, and the control plane is reached at `saas-api.tmprl.cloud:443` with that upstream's own credentials, since one Temporal Cloud API key authorizes both. The connection opens on first use rather than at startup, so a control plane you cannot reach does not stop the proxy serving everything else. Only Namespace-less calls are affected, which means only the upstream that serves them, named by `routing.system` or falling back to `routing.default`. To get the untranslated failure back, route those requests at a Temporal Service that serves them. Override the control plane under `apiTranslations.cloudApi`, which takes the same keys as an upstream: ```yaml apiTranslations: cloudApi: hostPort: saas-api.tmprl.cloud:443 # Defaults to Cloud's control plane. credentials: static: apiKey: ${TEMPORAL_CLOUD_API_KEY} ``` Set `cloudApi` in two cases: - **The upstream authenticates with a client certificate.** Set an API key under `credentials`. The Cloud Ops API accepts only API keys, so the proxy has no credential to inherit from the upstream, and it refuses translated calls until you provide one. - **You need to reach a different Cloud environment.** Set `hostPort` to that environment's control plane. If the address isn't a Cloud endpoint, the proxy reports it at startup but still accepts it, because test doubles and private environments often use addresses outside the Cloud domain. TLS is not inherited from the upstream, since the control plane is a different host and the upstream's server name or client certificate would not apply. The dial default stands instead, verifying against the system root pool. ## Authenticate and authorize inbound requests Inbound authentication runs on the gateway and is off by default: omit the top-level `auth` block to accept all requests. When present, `auth` must select exactly one authenticator: `staticToken`, `jwks`, or `external`. The gateway decides before the request is routed, so nothing reaches an upstream until the caller is admitted, and it strips the credential before forwarding upstream. Compare an inbound bearer token against a fixed value with `staticToken`: ```yaml auth: staticToken: token: ${GATEWAY_TOKEN} # Required. The expected token value. header: authorization # Header to read the token from. scheme: Bearer # Scheme prefix to strip before comparing. ``` Or verify a JWT's signature and claims against a JWKS endpoint with `jwks`: ```yaml auth: jwks: url: https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json # Required. Absolute https URL. audiences: - temporal-proxy issuer: https://issuer.example.com/ header: authorization scheme: Bearer ``` `token` (for `staticToken`) and `url` (for `jwks`) are required; the remaining fields are optional. ### Delegate the decision to an extension server For an identity system neither built-in authenticator covers, or for a decision that turns on more than who the caller is, point `auth.external` at an extension server you run. Declare the server under the top-level `extensionServers` block, the same way you would a [key management backend](/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/encrypt-payloads#plug-in-your-own-key-management-backend), and the proxy asks it about every stream it accepts, forwarding only the ones it is told to admit. ```yaml extensionServers: - name: authz hostPort: 127.0.0.1:9444 auth: external: name: authz # Required. Names an entry in extensionServers. credentialHeaders: - authorization ``` `name` must match a configured extension server. `credentialHeaders` names the metadata headers that carry the caller's credentials: the proxy lifts those into the request it sends the extension server and removes them from the stream it forwards upstream, so a credential the server consumes never reaches the Temporal Service. Declaring no headers does not hide the caller's credentials from the extension server, since the proxy forwards the caller's other metadata on the call either way. What you lose is the field naming them, so the server has to know which metadata to read and cannot tell a header the proxy vouches for from any other. Nothing is stripped before forwarding upstream either, so the caller's credential continues to the upstream alongside any credential configured for it. The server implements `api.auth.v1.AuthService`, one RPC defined in [`api/auth/v1`](https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/tree/main/api/auth/v1). Each request carries what the call is addressing and who is making it: | Field | Carries | | ------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `target.full_name` | The gRPC full method being invoked, leading slash included. Always set. | | `target.namespace` | The Temporal Namespace the request names. | | `credentials` | One entry per declared header the caller sent, each with the canonical header name and every value sent under it. | Both `target` fields come from the stream rather than from anything the caller claims, so a caller cannot forge either by sending a header. `target.namespace` is empty when the method names no Namespace, when the caller sent no message to read one from, or when the service is not one the proxy forwards. Empty means unknown rather than a Namespace called nothing, so match a Namespace-scoped rule against `full_name` as well. `credentials` is empty when you declared no headers or the caller sent none of them, which is an unauthenticated caller rather than a trusted one. Answer with a `decision`: - `DECISION_ALLOW` admits the caller and is the only value that does. A response left unfilled is `DECISION_UNSPECIFIED`, which denies, so there is no way to admit a caller by omission. - `DECISION_DENY` refuses the caller, who is told `PERMISSION_DENIED`. - `reason` is optional and written for whoever operates the server. The proxy records it and keeps it out of what a refused caller is told, so it can name internal systems or subjects. Return a gRPC error only for reaching no verdict at all, such as a backend the server cannot itself reach. The proxy denies either way, but an error keeps its status code, so `UNAVAILABLE` or `DEADLINE_EXCEEDED` tells a Worker to retry where a denial tells it not to bother. A server that cannot reach its own backend should report that rather than admit the caller. The [authorization example](https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/tree/main/examples/authz) maps a JWT to claims and then decides each call against them, the two steps Temporal Server splits across its `ClaimMapper` and `Authorizer`. It includes a Worker that cannot reach a second Namespace and an auditor that can read Workflow History but not start a Workflow. ## Present credentials to upstreams Each upstream can present its own credential to the Temporal Service, set under `credentials`. `static` is the only variant today; it injects a fixed API key as a bearer header on every outbound request, which is how you connect to Temporal Cloud: ```yaml upstreams: - name: cloud hostPort: my-ns.acct.tmprl.cloud:7233 credentials: static: apiKey: ${TEMPORAL_API_KEY} # Required. header: authorization # Optional header override. scheme: Bearer # Optional scheme override. ``` Credentials require TLS to the upstream. The proxy dials over TLS by default, so this is only an issue when you also set `insecure: true`. Credentials on a plaintext hop fail the configuration at startup rather than putting the key on the wire in the clear. ## Configure TLS TLS is configured in two independent places, both using the same keys: `ca`, `cert`, `key`, and `serverName`. `ca`, `cert`, and `key` are paths to PEM files on disk, not inline PEM content. On Kubernetes, let the chart mount them from a Secret and fill in the paths for you, as described in [Supply TLS material](/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/deploy-kubernetes#supply-tls-material). The two directions default differently, because a dialer can fall back on the system root pool and a listener has no certificate to fall back on. **Inbound, on the gateway.** The top-level `tls` block secures connections from your applications. Set `cert` and `key` for server TLS, and add `ca` to enforce mutual TLS, which requires each client to present a certificate signed by that CA. A gateway with no `tls` block serves plaintext, which is what local development usually handles. **Outbound, per upstream.** Each upstream dials over TLS whether or not it declares a `tls` block: - No `tls` block verifies the upstream against the system root certificate pool and presents no client certificate. This is what Temporal Cloud with an API key needs. - `ca` alone verifies the upstream against a private trust anchor, still presenting no client certificate. - `cert` and `key` together select mutual TLS and require `ca`. They must be set as a pair. - `insecure: true` dials plaintext, for a local development Service that terminates no TLS. Set `serverName` when the host you dial does not match the common name or SAN on the server's certificate. `insecure` and a `tls` block cannot be set together because they are opposite, so the configuration fails at startup rather than silently picking one. The same rules govern every outbound hop, so an `extensionServers` entry and the `apiTranslations.cloudApi` block read exactly the same way. > **📝 Note:** > Version note > > v0.6.0 made TLS the default for everything the proxy dials. Before it, an upstream with no `tls` block connected in > plaintext. A `tls: {}` block still means what it always did, so configurations that declared one keep working, but an > upstream that relied on the old plaintext default now needs `insecure: true`. > For payload encryption (envelope encryption, cloud KMS, and custom key backends), see [Encrypt payloads](/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/encrypt-payloads).